A Hole in the Heartland of South America, by Alejandro Deustua

While the OAS debates a minimalist resolution around the Colombian-Ecuadorian crisis spurred by Venezuela, the Bolivian State is weakening terminally without the Inter-American system worrying too much about it.

That way, while the Inter-American Forum undoes a conflict in northern South America without addressing its fundaments (the continuous intervention of Venezuela and the aggressiveness of the Narc-Terrorist FARC), lawlessness walks all over Bolivia fracturing the country in the midst of collective indifference.

Indeed, except for a slight expression of concern of the Secretary-General of the OAS for the rule of law in Bolivia, the Permanent Council of that body has not incorporated the imminence of a failed State in central South American to its agenda. This lack of action, however, may not be as inconsequential as the Bolivian government, the country's neighbors and the members of the Inter-American system think.

Indeed, the systematic destruction of the Bolivian State, which President Morales has undertaken since he assumed the government trying to refund the country, has turned into a modus vivendi: while each successive crisis seems terminal, it immediately ceases to be in the collective perception as soon as Mr. Morales partners take contact with him, making him legit (recognition of the Bolivian phenomenology as a "balancing factor" as a principal adviser to the Brazilian presidency said).

Revived, the Bolivian rulers undertake new destructing actions from which they continue to be rescued through European tours, Bolivarians speeches (and resources), neighborhood benevolence or indifference (some with fantastic dimensions as the temporary presidency of institutions such a CAN or MERCOSUR). The vicious circle sponsored by ideological affinity and bureaucratic inertia achieves the rescue them from deeper and deeper waters.

At the end of the day it does not matter much whether Bolivia disables its Constitutional Court, if the opposition is physically unable to participate in decisions of the Congress, if the Armed Forces is politically co-opted, if the Constituent Assembly violents its own rules, if the Bolivian government persists in the manipulation of law and the street, stirring the masses, and threatens erga omnes. This is indicative of life in the particular perception of “living well” designed by the cupola of MAS.

Therefore, a constitution adopted without debate, without opposition, with presidential policy and strong compulsion of the masses survive while awaiting a challenging approval by referendum called by a law that suffers, in turn, each of the unlawfulness listed. And despite the fact that five departments (Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Cochabamba and Tarija) disregard this law and deny the democratic status of the central government, it continues in its “refunding” purpose. Moreover, as the denomination of “dictator” does not bother Mr. Morales, the mentioned departments do not change their decision of calling, by their own authority, to autonomic referendums.

As a result Bolivia is "like never before" on the brink of "the worst crisis since 1982”, as told by the newspapers while the civil confrontation is still approaching and Bolivia dying only to resume after the normal cycle of chaos, as a vital sign. Indeed, it is in the midst of anarchy that the governments of Brazil and Argentina negotiated with Mr. Morales redundant contracts on supplying gas knowing that Bolivia will not respect the result (there is simply no new investment in hydrocarbons), the European governments receive Bolivian delegates endlessly seeking legitimacy and resources, given away without major conditions (except for his participation in the "partnership agreement" with the EU), and the anti-imperialist speech of Mr. Morales highlights the influence of Venezuelan in ALBA and Iran in the Chapare.

With so many signs of vitality, says the OAS, why worry about Bolivia. They may have reason, until a hole in the regional heartland awakens them at last.